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We use UK  survey  data  to analyze  the  puzzling  co-existence  of high  cost  revolving  consumer
credit  alongside  low yield  liquid  savings  in  household  balance  sheets,  which  we  name  the
‘co-holding  puzzle’.  Approximately  12%  of households  in  our  sample  co-hold,  on average,
£3800  of revolving  consumer  credit  on  which  they  incur  interest  charges,  even  though  they
could immediately  pay  down  all this  debt  using  their  liquid  assets.  Co-holders  are typically
more  ﬁnancially  literate,  with  above  average  income  and  education.  In  most  estimates  co-
holding is  also associated  with  impulsive  spending  behavior  on  the  part of the  household.
Our results  provide  empirical  support  to  theoretical  models  in  which  households  co-hold
as a means  of  managing  self-control  problems.
©  2014  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
. Introduction
Why  do consumers simultaneously hold high cost credit and low yield liquid assets? In US data, Gross and Souleles (2002)
nd 33% of individuals with credit card debt have at least two  months of disposable income available in liquid savings. This
o-existence of liquid assets and consumer debt has also been shown in a number of other studies using US data (Telyukova
nd Wright, 2008; Telyukova, 2013; Bertaut et al., 2009; Fulford, 2012). Correspondingly, using UK data, we  ﬁnd that 12%
f UK households hold, on average, £3800 of revolving credit on multiple credit products for which they incur interest
harges even though they could immediately pay down all this debt using their liquid assets (and with a month’s income in
iquid assets to spare). By ‘co-holding’ credit and assets, these households incur on average approximately £650 ($1050) in
nnecessary interest charges per annum. One-in-ﬁve ‘co-holders’ incur £1000 ($1600) in interest charges per annum due
o co-holding.
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eferees and the guest editors for useful comments and suggestions.
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What explains this failure to make a simple money-saving arbitrage between assets and debt? Households may  hold
liquid savings to transact purchases for which consumer credit cannot be used such as mortgage or rent payments (Telyukova
and Wright, 2008; Telyukova, 2013) or because credit limits, if paid down, might be withdrawn (Fulford, 2012). A related
explanation is that liquid savings might be held as insurance against unanticipated household expenses. Other reasons
may be that households are untroubled by this loss, or that co-holding arises due to (optimal) limited attention or mental
accounting and the ‘pain of paying’ from savings (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998).
The explanation which we explore in this paper is that consumers co-hold due to particular behavioral biases in their
decision making. We  focus on two sources of behavioral biases: poor ﬁnancial literacy and lack of self-control. First, less
ﬁnancially literate individuals may  not realize the existence of arbitrage opportunities and hence not recognize that co-
holding is a costly activity. Disney and Gathergood (2013) show poor ﬁnancial literacy is associated with higher cost consumer
credit portfolios. Recent studies have shown that lack of ﬁnancial literacy leads to a range of other sub-optimal ﬁnancial
outcomes including under-saving and suboptimal portfolio allocations (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007; Lusardi and Tufano,
2009; van Rooij et al., 2011a,b).
Second, lack of self-control and impulsive spending behavior might explain co-holding. Impulsive consumers may  engage
in spending mistakes at the point-of-sale (for example in shops or via online shopping) using their credit card, store card
or mail order account while, at the same time, holding monies in savings accounts or other savings products not avail-
able at point of sale. However, persistent co-holding might actually be explained as a form of self-control management
whereby consumers deliberately restrict their available-to-spend liquidity at point-of-sale by holding high utilization rates
on consumer credit, so limiting the opportunity for impulsive spending mistakes.
The idea of co-holding as self-control management is developed in the dual-self model of Bertaut et al. (2009) in which one
patient entity of the ‘inner-self’ controls a less patient entity by restricting access to credit via high utilization so as to control
credit liquidity. In this so-called ‘accountant-shopper’ framework, a patient ‘accountant’ self who manages the ﬁnances of the
household and has sole access to liquid savings with which to pay down credit, decides to revolve debt in order to restrict the
consumption opportunities of an impatient ‘shopper’ self who cannot access savings and is reliant on the credit decisions of
the accountant. Bertaut et al. (2009) show that a stable equilibrium exists in which savings and credit are held simultaneously
by the accountant-shopper. In their model the accountant-shopper either constitutes a two-person household or a single
self-aware individual who undertakes planning behavior as an accountant to restrict the consumption opportunities they
will be tempted to indulge in as a shopper. Thus, by making one’s savings less accessible and non-spendable for immediate
consumption, consumers minimize their vulnerability to impulsive spending by maintaining revolving consumer credit debt
simultaneously with savings.
We  present empirical evidence on the importance of behavioral characteristics to co-holding, focusing on ﬁnancial liter-
acy, self-control and related behaviors in explaining levels of co-holding among a representative sample of UK households.
Our survey data provides access to a broad range of questions together with detailed information on household ﬁnances,
demographics and other respondent characteristics.
Our results show that among a representative sample of households, co-holding is not associated with poor ﬁnancial
literacy or lack of education, but is associated with lack of self-control. Co-holders perform above-average when answer-
ing ﬁnancial literacy questions. Also, co-holders are mostly of working age and have above average levels of education,
employment and household income. However, co-holders self-report high rates of impulsive spending behavior. Multi-
variate probit estimates show impulsiveness predicts co-holding in the majority of our models. This result is robust to
controls for time preference (i.e. patience), perceived income risk and alternative measures of the cost of co-holding. Our
ﬁndings are consistent with the suggestion that co-holding is a planned behavior of the type modeled in Bertaut et al.
(2009).
We make the following new contributions to the literature: ﬁrstly, we provide new evidence on the characteristics of
co-holders. We show that co-holding households have relatively complex portfolios of consumer credit, including credit
cards, installment loans and ﬂexible options such as overdrafts. Co-holding households hold a range of credit items which
could be repaid or pre-paid without incurring ﬁnancial charges.
Secondly, using econometric models, we ﬁnd that self-control positively predicts co-holding. Our models control for
a broad set of covariates and test the sensitivity of our analysis to different levels of co-holding. In our sample, in which
approximately one quarter of co-holding households report impulsive spending behavior, estimates imply that a household
which exhibits impulsiveness in spending decisions is approximately 70% more likely to co-hold at least £1000 of consumer
credit. Estimates also imply that among co-holders impulsiveness is associated with co-holding approximately £3100, on
average, equivalent to foregoing £550 in interest payments per annum. We  test the robustness of our ﬁndings to a variety
of speciﬁcations.
Thirdly, we compare co-holding behavior with households that are exclusively either borrowers, savers or those that
neither save nor borrow. This allows us to compare behavioral characteristics of co-holders with households that have
different types of ﬁnancial market participation. Results show self-control positively predicts co-holding compared with
saving or holding neither assets or debt. Self-control does not predict co-holding compared with borrowing, but ﬁnancial
literacy does raise the likelihood of co-holding. Savers and co-holders are indistinct with regards to ﬁnancial literacy, but
co-holders exhibit signiﬁcantly less self-control.
Fourthly, we incorporate self-reported measures of income risk into the analysis and show that co-holding is not explained
by anticipated future income variability which might induce precautionary saving behavior on the part of the household
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n the face of perceived income risk. Co-holders self-report rates of expected unemployment similar to non-co-holders and
verage rates of expected future additional credit use below those of borrowers.
Our results do not provide a complete explanation for co-holding or unambiguous support for the Bertaut et al. (2009)
ccountant-shopper model. Instead, they show that behavioral characteristics are important in explaining some of the
bserved prevalence of co-holding in the data.1 In doing so, this paper contributes to the existing literature on whether
onsumers behave rationally in credit markets (Bernheim, 1995; Campbell, 2006; Agarwal et al., 2006, 2009). Our results are
lso relevant to the literature on ﬁnancial literacy and individual behavior (Bernheim, 1998; Lusardi, 2008; Jappelli, 2010)
nd more generally to the literature on the role of self-control problems in shaping individual behavior related to ﬁnancial
ecision making (Strotz, 1955; Thaler and Shefrin, 1981; Laibson, 1997; Gul and Pesendorfer, 2001; Benhabib and Bisin,
005; Fudenberg and Levine, 2006; Heidhues and Ko˝szegi, 2010).
. Data
.1. Sample summary statistics and measure of co-holding
Our data source is the YouGov Debt Tracker survey of household ﬁnances, also used in Disney and Gathergood (2013).
he Debt Tracker is a quarterly cross-sectional survey of a representative sample of approximately 2500 UK households
onducted via the Internet. YouGov makes special provisions for non-internet users such that their survey sample is repre-
entative of the population as a whole. The core survey includes approximately 85 questions which cover in detail household
nances, demographics, education, labor market situation and ﬁnancial product use. We  use data from the October 2010
urvey.
Summary statistics for our sample of households are provided in Table 1. Column 1 reports mean values for the whole
ample of 2584 households. Half of all respondents are male, two thirds married and one ﬁfth have dependent children. 59%
f households have a respondent in employment, with 43% having the respondent’s partner in full-time employment. 70%
f households are home-owners. Mean household income is £35,600 with median income at £30,000.
Table 1 also provides summary statistics for household borrowing and savings. For consumer borrowing the survey data
ontains individual balances on an exhaustive range of consumer credit products, including commonly held products such as
redit cards, personal loans and store cards, but also less common forms of borrowing such as mail order and hire-purchase
oans. The data include the value of outstanding debt for each product type; excluding non-revolving balances which would
e repaid within the current payment period without incurring interest charges (such as within-month balances on credit and
tore cards). We  sum the value of individual balances on each consumer credit product to give a value for total outstanding
evolving consumer credit that incurs interest. This measure excludes mortgage debt. Among our whole sample (Column 1)
he mean value of consumer credit debt is just above £2000.
Our measure of saving is a self-reported measure of liquid savings based on a speciﬁc survey question. We  use this
pproach as for measuring co-holding our interest is in the level of liquid savings available to the household which could
e used to pay down consumer credit balances. Detailed data on savings and investments by product is not available in the
urvey. The total value of liquid savings we use is derived from a survey question in which respondents were asked to state
he value of their non-pension savings which could be accessed easily:
‘How much do you [and your partner] have in liquid savings? These are savings that could easily be used in an emergency
and are not tied up in a pension or long term savings product.’
This question is designed to identify revolving ﬁnancial assets by the phrase ‘savings’ and not deposit- or current account
alances held between salary/beneﬁt payment periods. The value of liquid savings we use is based on the respondents’ own
udgment about the liquidity of their savings and investments. The use of ‘emergency funds’ as a measure of liquid savings
as been conceptualized by Johnson and Widdows (1985), who  deﬁne it as very liquid assets including money market funds,
avings- and checking accounts. The mean value among our whole sample is £9211. This compares with mean savings
ccount balances reported by households in the UK ‘Wealth and Assets Survey’ (WAS) of £8700 (comprising £5900 held in
tandard savings accounts and £2800 in tax-exempt ‘Individual Savings Accounts’). The distribution of savings across age
nd income brackets in our data also matches the distribution in the WAS  closely.
Table 1 also provides summary statistics for four household types: ‘borrower’, ‘saver’, ‘neither borrower nor saver’ and
co-holder’. All households in the survey are classiﬁed as (exactly) one of these types based on values of consumer borrowing
nd liquid savings. Co-holders are deﬁned as households with a positive value of liquid savings who also hold a positive
alue of total consumer credit at the same time. To account for liquidity needs, following Gross and Souleles (2002), we
llow for liquid savings to a value of one month’s disposable income, which we  calculate at the individual household level,
nd deduct this value from reported liquid savings when calculating co-holding balances. We  do so because respondents
ay report within-period deposit account balances as savings, or because households might hold liquid savings against
1 Indeed, the accountant-shopper model of Bertaut et al. (2009) matches the observed wealth distribution in US data only under the assumption of
ifferential time preference in addition to lack of self-control, suggesting self-control alone cannot itself explain the co-holding puzzle.
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Table  1
Sample characteristics by ﬁnancial market participation.
Sample Borrower Saver Neither borrower
nor saver
Co-holder
Age
18–24 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.03
25–34  0.19 0.26 0.18 0.16 0.20
35–44 0.20 0.25 0.18 0.17 0.22
45–54 0.18 0.22 0.15 0.18 0.22
55+  0.36 0.19 0.41 0.43 0.33
Demographics
Male  (=1) 0.50 0.43 0.53 0.50 0.54
Married/living as married (=1) 0.67 0.69 0.64 0.67 0.77
Dependent children (=1) 0.20 0.32 0.16 0.17 0.22
Education leaving age 18.92 18.71 19.32 18.59 18.99
Employment
Employed (=1) 0.59 0.71 0.55 0.51 0.70
Unemployed (=1) 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.03
Retired/student/housewife/disabled 0.37 0.25 0.42 0.43 0.27
Spouse employed (=1) 0.43 0.52 0.37 0.41 0.55
Housing
Homeowner without mortgage (=1) 0.29 0.10 0.37 0.34 0.24
Homeowner with mortgage (=1) 0.41 0.47 0.38 0.36 0.55
Household ﬁnances
Household income (£) 35,579 35,172 37,973 30,685 42,869
(30,000) (32,000) (32,000) (28,000) (35,000)
Disposable household income (£) 15,923 15,179 18,036 12,881 19,316
(13,739) (13,212) (15,630) (11,400) (16,560)
Liquid savings (£) 9211 117 21,577 0 12,079
(0)  (0) (10,000) (0) (6000)
Consumer credit debt (£) 2036 6943 0 0 6191
(0)  (3100) (0) (0) (4000)
Co-holding (£) 462 105 0 0 3821
(0)  (0) (0) (0) (2500)
Credit constrained (=1) 0.09 0.22 0.04 0.07 0.10
Income and expenditure risk
Expects to be unemployed (=1) 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.09
Likely to borrow more in future (=1) 0.09 0.20 0.04 0.07 0.10
Behavioral characteristics
Literacy score (0–3) 1.90 1.75 2.12 1.71 1.99
Impulsive spender (=1) 0.13 0.26 0.07 0.10 0.22
Heavy discounter (=1) 0.09 0.17 0.06 0.07 0.12Observations 2584 491 933 861 299
Note: Mean values reported, medians in parentheses for ﬁnancial variables.
within-month liquidity needs or on a precautionary basis. We calculate the amount of co-holding for each household. In
total, 350 households hold liquid savings and consumer credit at the same time. Net of one month’s disposable income (on
average 45% of gross income), this number falls to 299, which we deﬁne as the co-holding group.
Co-holders can be classiﬁed into two types based on the relative size of their liquid savings and consumer credit debt.
Firstly, some co-holding households hold net liquid saving balances in excess of their consumer credit balances and so
could pay down all their consumer credit balance with savings to spare. Secondly, other co-holding households hold net
liquid savings balances below their consumer credit balances and so could only partly pay down their consumer credit
balance if they used all of their liquid savings. In our data, 199 households are of the ﬁrst type and 100 are of the second
type. The mean value of co-holding within the co-holders group is £3800 with the median value £2500. We  deﬁne the
amount of co-holding as the minimum of positive consumer credit and positive liquid savings (minus one month’s disposable
income).
For the other groups, borrowers are deﬁned as households with non-zero total consumer credit balances and liquid
savings of less than one month’s disposable income (51 of these hold savings above zero). Mean consumer credit debt
among borrowers is £6900 and the median is £3100. Savers are deﬁned as households with non-zero liquid savings and
zero consumer credit balances. Mean savings among savers is £21,500 with median £10,000.
The group ‘neither borrowers nor savers’ is deﬁned as households with zero reported liquid savings and zero reported
consumer credit balances. Although these households report zero balances for both savings and debt, we  might expect that
they hold some form of savings whether in cash or in small values of revolving deposit account end-of-month surpluses.
However, we  choose not to combine this group with savers as their reported liquid savings are zero and among this group
average income is 20% lower than that of savers. But, combining this group with savers in the econometric analysis does not
change our results. We  also report estimates from speciﬁcations which combine the two  groups later in the analysis.
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.2. Survey data on behavioral characteristics
We  are able to supplement the core YouGov survey with our measures of behavioral characteristics. Our survey includes
hree ﬁnancial literacy questions based on Lusardi and Tufano (2009), responses to which are used as a measure of ﬁnancial
iteracy on the part of the respondent. These test respondents’ ability to make a simple interest calculation, show they
nderstand interest compounding and can correctly evaluate the impact of minimum payments on a credit card contract.
ach of the questions was framed in the context of a choice over a consumer credit product and focused on a core concept
n consumer credit ﬁnance. The questions were constructed using a multiple-choice format:
Simple Interest Question:
. ‘Cheryl owes £1000 on her bank overdraft and the interest rate she is charged is 15% per year. If she didn’t pay anything
off, at this interest rate, how much money would she owe  on her overdraft after one year?’
 £850 • £1000 • £1150 • £1500 • Do not know
Compound Interest Question:
. ‘Sarah owes £1000 on her credit card and the interest rate she is charged is 20% per year compounded annually. If she
didn’t pay anything off, at this interest rate, how many years would it take for the amount she owes to double?’
 Less than 5 years • Between 5 and 10 years
 More than 10 years • Do not know
Minimum Payments Question:
. ‘David has a credit card debt of £3000 at an Annual Percentage Rate of 12% (or 1% per month). He makes payments of £30
per month and does not gain any charges or additional spending on the card. How long will it take him to pay off this
debt?’
 Less than 5 years • Between 5 and 10 years • More than 10 years
 None of the above, he will continue to be in debt • Do not know
We also included a survey instrument to elicit self-control problems on the part of the respondent. We  use the approach
f Ameriks et al. (2003, 2007) by using Likert scale responses by which individuals associate or disassociate themselves with
 short statement which describes impulsive behavior. This approach is dependent upon self-awareness on the part of the
espondent. We  label this question ‘impulsive spending’ and assign a value of one if the respondent answers ‘agree strongly’
r ‘tend to agree’ and a value of zero otherwise:
Impulsive spender:
‘I am impulsive and tend to buy things even when I can’t really afford them’
a) Agree strongly (b) Tend to agree
c) Neither agree nor disagree (d) Tend to disagree
e) Disagree strongly (f) Do not know
Our survey data also contains a separate question on respondent spending behavior relating to time preference for
onsumption. We  use responses to this question to identify impulsive spending behavior due to lack of self-control (time
nconsistency) from a strong preference on near-term consumption (time preference). We  label this question ‘heavy dis-
ounter’, again assigning a value of one is the respondent answers ‘agree strongly’ or ‘tend to agree’ and a value of zero
therwise:
Heavy discounter:
‘I am prepared to spend now and let the future take care of itself’
a) Agree strongly (b) Tend to agree
c) Neither agree nor disagree (d) Tend to disagree
e) Disagree strongly (f) Do not knowIn addition to these questions on behavioral characteristics we  also make use of data from the survey on income risk
o control for income risk which might induce the household to hold additional precautionary liquid savings. We measure
ncome risk based on the self-reported likelihood of respondents facing unemployment in the near future. We  label this
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question ‘expects to be unemployed’ and assign a value of one if the respondent answers ‘very likely’ or ‘fairly likely’ and a
value of zero otherwise:
Unemployment risk:
• ‘How likely or unlikely do you think it is that you will be made redundant or become unemployed over the next 6 months?’
(a) Very likely (b) Fairly likely
(c) Neither likely or unlikely (d) Fairly unlikely
(e) Very unlikely (f) Do not know
We also incorporate a self-reported measure of the likelihood of needing to draw upon credit in the near future, possible
answers and our coding of which are the same as for the unemployment risk question above, which we  label ‘likely to borrow
more in future’:
Borrowing risk:
• ‘In the near future how likely or unlikely is it that you will need to borrow any more money over the next 3 months?’
Finally, we create an indicator measuring the credit constraints a household faces in order to distinguish whether house-
holds are restrained in their borrowing capacity. This dummy  takes the value one if respondents state ‘yes’ in response to
at least one of the following descriptors: ‘ﬁnancial circumstances have got worse: can’t get credit’; ‘credit card withdrawn’;
‘credit limit reduced’; ‘overdraft withdrawn’; ‘applied for a particular credit product and the outcome is either ‘credit amount
was less than wanted’ or ‘turned down’. We  label this variable ‘credit constrained’.
2.3. Behavioral characteristics and co-holding
In this section we provide summary statistics on the relationship between household behavioral characteristics and co-
holding. The main insight from these summary statistics is that, compared with other types, co-holders are more ﬁnancially
literate than borrowers, but they also report high rates of impulsive spending behavior compared with other household
types.
From Table 1, among co-holders the mean literacy score (number of ﬁnancial literacy questions answered correctly) is
1.99, which is 5% higher than the sample average and approximately 15% higher than the mean scores for borrowers and
the ‘neither/nor’ group. The socio-economic characteristics of co-holders are in keeping with their higher literacy scores.
Compared with the whole sample, co-holders are typically more likely to be married, in employment plus have a partner in
employment and to be home-owners with mortgages.
Co-holders also have the highest mean income among the four groups (20% higher than the sample average and 22%
higher than households who borrow but hold no liquid savings) and higher than average balances of both liquid savings and
consumer credit. Also, co-holders are only slightly more likely to self-report that they are credit constrained (10%) compared
with the whole sample (9%). Borrowers report much higher rates of being credit constrained (22%).
Among the co-holding group, 22% of respondents strongly agreed or agreed with the statement that they are impulsive
spenders. This proportion of impulsive spenders among the co-holding group is 9 percentage points higher than the whole
sample average and more than three times that among savers and twice that among ‘neither/nor’ respondents. Among
borrowers, the proportion of respondents who report being impulsive spenders is 4% higher than among co-holders.
More detailed summary statistics for households broken down by the level of household co-holding are presented in
Table 2. These reveal that higher levels of co-holding, and higher levels of more costly co-holding (which we  deﬁne below)
are associated with both better ﬁnancial literacy but also higher likelihood of being an impulsive spender. The ﬁrst two
columns of Table 2 report summary statistics for co-holders by their amount of co-holding.
Among the 299 co-holding households, 136 households co-hold between £250 and £2000 of consumer credit debt and
liquid savings and 163 co-hold more than £2000. Among the larger co-holders, the mean literacy score is 0.21 points higher
and the proportion of impulsive spenders 4% larger. Mean household income among that group is also 48% higher than
among the smaller co-holders.
The second two columns of Table 2 separate co-holders by the ﬁnancial cost of their co-holding. We  estimate the ﬁnancial
cost of co-holding using household level credit portfolio data. Most households in the sample hold multiple consumer credit
products. Table 3 provides summary statistics for consumer credit portfolios of co-holding households. Average balances
for individual credit products among credit portfolios of co-holding households reveal much heterogeneity as they contain
a wide variety of credit products, not just credit card debt. While credit card debt is on average the largest credit product
type, personal loans and car loans also constitute sizeable amounts to the average portfolio.To calculate the interest cost of co-holding we  ﬁrst attach product-speciﬁc ‘Annualized Percentage Interest Rates’ (APRs)
to each product type held by households. The product-speciﬁc APRs are representative APRs derived from a monthly data
series provided by the ‘Financial and Leasing Association’ (FLA), the UK industry body for the consumer credit industry.
Assuming that households would pay down their most expensive consumer credit products ﬁrst, we can calculate the
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Table  2
Sample characteristics by co-holding.
(1) (2)
Co-holding Co-holding cost
£250–£2000 >£2000 £100–£500 >£500
Age
18–24 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.01
25–34  0.21 0.19 0.22 0.18
35–44 0.15 0.28 0.15 0.30
45–54 0.24 0.20 0.23 0.21
55+  0.34 0.32 0.35 0.30
Demographics
Male  (=1) 0.47 0.60 0.49 0.59
Married/living as married (=1) 0.74 0.80 0.76 0.78
Dependent children (=1) 0.15 0.28 0.15 0.30
Education leaving age 18.74 19.21 18.80 19.23
Employment
Employed (=1) 0.68 0.71 0.68 0.72
Unemployed (=1) 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Retired/student/housewife/disabled 0.29 0.26 0.29 0.25
Spouse  employed (=1) 0.51 0.58 0.54 0.56
Housing
Homeowner without mortgage (=1) 0.26 0.22 0.27 0.20
Homeowner with mortgage (=1) 0.48 0.61 0.49 0.62
Household ﬁnances
Household income (£) 34,000 50,269 36,728 50,329
(30,000) (45,000) (32,000) (45,000)
Disposable household income (£) 15,102 22,833 16,447 22,802
(13,892) (20,314) (14,894) (20,314)
Liquid  savings (£) 8651 14,938 10,485 14,014
(5000) (8000) (5000) (7500)
Consumer credit debt (£) 2816 9006 3090 9958
(1320) (6830) (1700) (8000)
Co-holding (£) 1207 6001 1609 6507
(1000) (5000) (1300) (5000)
Credit  constrained (=1) 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.13
Income and expenditure risk
Expects to be unemployed (=1) 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.10
Likely  to borrow more in future (=1) 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.11
Behavioral characteristics
Literacy score (0–3) 1.88 2.09 1.96 2.04
Impulsive spender (=1) 0.20 0.24 0.20 0.25
Heavy  discounter (=1) 0.10 0.14 0.09 0.16
Observations 136 163 164 135
Deﬁnitions:
(1) ‘Co-holding’ is constructed as the minimum of liquid savings (minus one month’s disposable income) and consumer credit.
(2)  ‘Co-holding cost’ is calculated as the incurred credit charge plus interest foregone by co-holding.
Note:  Mean values reported, medians in parentheses for ﬁnancial variables.
Table 3
Consumer credit portfolios for co-holders.
Co-holding £250–£2000 Co-holding > £2000
Consumer credit debt (£) 2816 9006
Credit  card (£) 1472 2696
Store  card (£) 72 98
Personal loan (£) 360 2820
Overdraft (£) 383 634
Hire-purchase agreement (£) 160 400
Car  loan (£) 257 2067
Mail  order catalog (£) 49 21
Other  loan (£) 50 260
Observations 136 163
Note: Mean values reported.
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annualized interest cost of co-holding for each household.2 164 co-holding households in our sample incur interest costs
between £100 and £500 per annum. 135 co-holding households incur annual interest costs in excess of £500 per annum.
Households in the higher-cost co-holding group have higher mean ﬁnancial literacy scores (0.08 points difference)
plus a 5% higher proportion of being impulsive spenders compared with the lower cost co-holding group. Higher-cost
co-holders also have higher mean household income (37% higher) and higher rates of home ownership (6 percentage
points).
3. Econometric results
The summary statistics from the previous section indicate that co-holding households are more likely to report self-
control problems and also exhibit higher levels of ﬁnancial literacy, especially compared with borrowers. However,
cross-group comparisons show households of the different types also differ in terms of demographic-, income- and other
characteristics. We  now present estimates from a series of multivariate econometric models which condition on these
covariates.
First, we estimate a series of models which explain an 1/0 indicator variable for co-holding (a dichotomous dummy
variable) as a function of behavioral characteristics, ﬁnancial literacy and controls. The general form of the models we
estimate is given in Eq. (1):
ch = ˛0 + ˇ1imp + ˇ2fil + ˇ3dis + X′ω + u (1)
where ch denotes a co-holding dummy, imp  the impulsive dummy, ﬁl the ﬁnancial literacy score measured on a 0–3 scale
and dis the heavy discounter dummy. The vector of control variables X includes the covariates shown in Table 1. Further
controls and omitted control groups being described in the notes of the result tables. As the dependent variable is a 1/0
dummy  variable we estimate Eq. (1) using a probit model. Subsequently, we also estimate a Tobit model to explain the level
of co-holding and the cost incurred among co-holders.
3.1. Probit estimates
Our baseline estimates of Eq. 1 are shown in Table 4 which shows estimates for two  speciﬁcations. In the ﬁrst, the
dependent variable is a 1/0 dummy  variable indicating co-holding of at least £1000 (Column 1), in the second a 1/0 dummy
variable indicating co-holding of at least £2000 (Column 2).
Turning ﬁrst to covariates, results show no strong relationship between co-holding and age. In Column 1 younger house-
holds aged 18–24 are 0.075 percentage points less likely to co-hold compared with the omitted age group (44–55). Against
a baseline probability of 9.8% this equates to a 77% reduction in likelihood. However, in our cross-sectional data we  cannot
distinguish age from cohort effects.
Among other covariates, the indicator variable for being a mortgaged homeowner is positive and statistically signiﬁcant,
the marginal effect implying mortgaged home owners are 38% more likely to co-hold. Compared to renters and outright
homeowners, co-holding of mortgage holders may  in part be related to liquid savings needs for reﬁnancing or precaution
for mortgage repayments. This may  be relevant in our sample period (October 2010), during which uncertainties in the
mortgage reﬁnancing market and over the future path of mortgage interest rates were raised. These patterns in covariates
are very similar in Column 2.
The coefﬁcient on the ﬁnancial literacy score is positive in both speciﬁcations, but not statistically signiﬁcant. This indi-
cates that there is no evidence for co-holding being associated with ﬁnancial ignorance. The coefﬁcient on the impulsive
spender indicator variable is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level in both speciﬁcations. The magnitude of the
marginal effect evaluated against the baseline probability is 69% in Column 1, 67% in Column 2. The very similar coefﬁcient
in the Column 2 speciﬁcation shows the relationship between impulsiveness and co-holding is also strong at high levels of
co-holding.
The heavy discounter variable is not signiﬁcant in either speciﬁcation, implying that co-holding is not simply explained by
time preference. Also, the coefﬁcient on the variable measuring unemployment expectations is negative in both speciﬁcations
and statistically not signiﬁcant in each case. The coefﬁcient on the variable measuring expected future additional borrowing
is also statistically not signiﬁcant in both speciﬁcations. These results provide no evidence for perceived predictable labor
income risk or predictable dependency on credit explaining co-holding. They do not, however, rule out the possibility that
unpredictable idiosyncratic risks or expenditure risks give rise to co-holding behavior.Table 5 presents additional estimates in which the dependent variable is in each case an indicator variable for the level of
cost of co-holding. Again, there is no strong and signiﬁcant age proﬁle (apart from the 18–24 age bracket) or education leaving
age proﬁle in co-holding. Co-holding at a cost of more than £100 increases in likelihood with employment in Column 1, but
the coefﬁcient on the employed dummy  is not signiﬁcant in either speciﬁcation for higher-cost co-holding. The coefﬁcient
2 This is a conservative assumption as these are households who we know incur ‘unnecessary’ costs. Hence, our estimates should be seen as a minimum.
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Table  4
Probit model for characteristics of co-holders.
(1) (2)
Co-holding > £1000 Co-holding > £2000
ˇ/SE Margin ˇ/SE Margin
Age
18–24 −0.481** −0.075** −0.716** −0.081**
(0.216) (0.308)
25–34  −0.117 −0.018 −0.039 −0.004
(0.120) (0.135)
35–44 −0.055 −0.009 −0.006 −0.001
(0.111) (0.123)
55+  0.090 0.014 0.223* 0.025*
(0.116) (0.131)
Employment
Employed (=1) 0.104 0.016 0.121 0.014
(0.096) (0.108)
Unemployed (=1) −0.136 −0.021 0.024 0.003
(0.218) (0.237)
Housing
Homeowner without mortgage (=1) 0.035 0.005 0.067 0.008
(0.121) (0.138)
Homeowner with mortgage (=1) 0.237** 0.037** 0.248** 0.028**
(0.099) (0.113)
Household ﬁnances
Household income (£10,000s) 0.447 0.070 0.631 0.071
(0.345) (0.403)
Household income2 −0.142 −0.022 −0.179 −0.020
(0.121) (0.137)
Income and expenditure risk
Expects to be unemployed (=1) 0.003 0.000 −0.070 −0.008
(0.129) (0.146)
Likely to borrow more in future (=1) −0.011 −0.002 0.043 0.005
(0.128) (0.141)
Behavioral characteristics
Literacy score (0–3) 0.038 0.006 0.055 0.006
(0.039) (0.044)
Impulsive spender (=1) 0.435*** 0.068*** 0.430*** 0.048***
(0.100) (0.111)
Heavy discounter (=1) 0.110 0.017 0.085 0.010
(0.118) (0.131)
Observations 2584 2584
Pseudo R2 0.060 0.084
LR  2 98.947 111.463
Prob  > 2 0.000 0.000
Baseline predicted probability 0.098 0.072
Note: Omitted reference groups are, for Employment: Renter/Student/Housewife/Disabled; for Housing: Private renter/Social renter. Further controls for
spouse employment status, gender, marital status, dependent children and education leaving age.
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
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*** p < 0.01.
n the mortgaged homeownership dummy  is positive and statistically signiﬁcant for co-holding at a cost of more than £100
nd at a cost of more than £500, but not for co-holding at a cost of more than £1000.
The sign, magnitude and statistical signiﬁcant of the behavioral characteristics variables are very similar to the previous
esults. The ﬁnancial literacy score is not statistically signiﬁcant in any of the speciﬁcations. Co-holding at all levels of
ost increases in likelihood with impulsiveness. The magnitudes of the marginal effects on the impulsive spender dummy
ariable are again large: the implied effects are 65% in Column 1, 63% in Column 2 and 86% in Column 3. The coefﬁcients on
he heavy discounter variable are again not statistically signiﬁcant. Also, neither the unemployment expectation variable
or the anticipated future borrowing variable are signiﬁcant in these estimates.
For robustness, in Table 6 we also re-estimate the speciﬁcations from Table 4 to allow more ﬂexibility in the relationship
etween ﬁnancial literacy, impulsiveness and co-holding. We  augment the speciﬁcation by entering the ﬁnancial literacy
core as a series of dummy  variables instead of one continuous 0–3 variable (literacy score = 1, literacy score = 2, liter-
cy score = 3, omitted group literacy score = 0). Similarly, the impulsive spender measure enters as two dummy  variables
impulsive = agree and impulsive = disagree, omitted group = neither agree nor disagree) instead of one 1/0 dummy  variable
aking a value of one for agree and zero otherwise. As before, none of the literacy score variables are statistically signiﬁcant.
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Table  5
Probit model for characteristics of costly co-holders.
(1) (2) (3)
Co-holding cost > £100 Co-holding cost > £500 Co-holding cost > £1000
ˇ/SE Margin ˇ/SE Margin ˇ/SE Margin
Age
18–24 −0.376** −0.069** −0.573* −0.049* −0.761* −0.022*
(0.191) (0.312) (0.440)
25–34 −0.080 −0.015 −0.104 −0.009 −0.478** −0.014**
(0.113) (0.151) (0.239)
35–44 −0.078 −0.014 0.077 0.007 0.033 0.001
(0.106) (0.132) (0.189)
55+  0.006 0.001 0.153 0.013 0.174 0.005
(0.110) (0.148) (0.209)
Employment
Employed (=1) 0.176* 0.032* 0.046 0.004 0.131 0.004
(0.091) (0.121) (0.178)
Unemployed (=1) −0.041 −0.007 −0.091 −0.008 0.267 0.008
(0.198) (0.271) (0.339)
Housing
Homeowner without mortgage (=1) 0.022 0.004 0.028 0.002 0.001 0.000
(0.113) (0.156) (0.212)
Homeowner with mortgage (=1) 0.206** 0.038** 0.219* 0.019* −0.101 −0.003
(0.093) (0.124) (0.182)
Household ﬁnances
Household income (£10,000s) 0.373 0.068 0.290 0.025 −0.417 −0.012
(0.322) (0.435) (0.701)
Household income2 −0.143 −0.026 −0.062 −0.005 0.183 0.005
(0.114) (0.148) (0.260)
Income and expenditure risk
Expects to be unemployed (=1) −0.015 −0.003 −0.010 −0.001 −0.030 −0.001
(0.123) (0.157) (0.229)
Likely to borrow more in future (=1) 0.017 0.003 0.074 0.006 0.062 0.002
(0.121) (0.152) (0.218)
Behavioral characteristics
Literacy score (0–3) 0.039 0.007 0.014 0.001 −0.068 −0.002
(0.037) (0.049) (0.069)
Impulsive spender (=1) 0.409*** 0.075*** 0.389*** 0.033*** 0.636*** 0.018***
(0.096) (0.120) (0.160)
Heavy discounter (=1) 0.046 0.008 0.162 0.014 −0.026 −0.001
(0.115) (0.139) (0.209)
Observations 2584 2584 2584
Pseudo R2 0.047 0.092 0.157
LR  2 87.926 96.976 82.213
Prob > 2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Baseline predicted probability 0.116 0.052 0.021
Note: Omitted reference groups are, for Employment: Renter/Student/Housewife/Disabled; for Housing: Private renter/Social renter. Further controls for
spouse employment status, for gender, marital status, dependent children and education leaving age.
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
The impulsive = agree variable is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level of signiﬁcance in each of the speciﬁcations and the
magnitude of the coefﬁcients are very similar to before, whereas the impulsive = disagree variable is not signiﬁcant in each
speciﬁcation. These results conﬁrm the pattern seen in the coefﬁcient estimates in Tables 4 and 5 that co-holding is unrelated
to ﬁnancial literacy, but increases in likelihood with self-reported impulsiveness.
3.2. Tobit estimates
We  now present results from estimated models which explain the extent of co-holding. Table 7 shows results from
two Tobit models where the dependent variable is the continuous level of co-holding (Column 1) and the continuous cost
incurred due to co-holding (Column 2). Households with no co-holding are assigned a value of zero. The co-holding value is
the minimum value of consumer credit or liquid savings. The set of covariates included in the model is identical to that in
the previous tables, as is the inclusion of the variables capturing behavioral characteristics.
Results from estimated models in both columns are very similar, and reveal the same pattern in the coefﬁcients as
those seen in the previous estimates. The level of co-holding is increasing in employment and mortgaged homeownership
J. Gathergood, J. Weber / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 107 (2014) 455–469 465
Table  6
Probit model sensitivity check.
(1) (2)
Co-holding > £1000 Co-holding > £2000
ˇ/SE Margin ˇ/SE Margin
Literacy score = 1 −0.002 −0.000 0.104 0.012
(0.143) (0.169)
Literacy score = 2 0.181 0.028 0.238 0.027
(0.140) (0.166)
Literacy score = 3 0.072 0.011 0.189 0.021
(0.144) (0.168)
Impulsive = Agree 0.441*** 0.069*** 0.404*** 0.045***
(0.120) (0.132)
Impulsive = Disagree −0.037 −0.006 −0.068 −0.008
(0.096) (0.107)
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aote: Omitted groups are, for Financial Literacy: zero correct answers; for Impulsivenss: Neither disagree nor agree. Further controls as in Table 4.
tandard errors in parentheses.
 p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
nd decreasing with the youngest age group. The coefﬁcient on the ﬁnancial literacy score is positive but not statistically
igniﬁcant in either speciﬁcation.
The coefﬁcient on the impulsive spender indicator variable is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The
oefﬁcient value in Column 1 implies that impulsive spending, evaluated at the means of covariates, is associated with
pproximately £3100 of co-holding. The coefﬁcient value on the impulsive spender variable in Column 2, again evaluated
t the means of covariates, implies impulsive spending is associated with approximately £550 of interest costs due to
o-holding. As with the results in the previous tables, the coefﬁcients on the unemployment expectation and credit use
xpectation variables are both statistically not signiﬁcant.
For robustness, we again estimate all models where both literacy score and impulsiveness are included as dummies
results not shown). These alternative speciﬁcations do not alter the results: in the case of ﬁnancial literacy answering one,
wo or three questions correctly is not statistically signiﬁcant relative to the omitted group of zero questions answered
orrectly; in the case of impulsiveness, agreeing is signiﬁcant at the 1% level and negative relative to the baseline of neither
greeing nor disagreeing.
.3. Estimates for alternative comparison groups
The results presented so far show that impulsiveness is positively and signiﬁcantly associated with co-holding. However,
hese estimates do not allow us to conclude that impulsiveness is particularly associated with co-holding as distinct from
orrowing. It could be argued that the relationship we  observe is between impulsiveness and borrowing and that, as bor-
owing is one aspect of co-holding, is what explains the positive association between impulsiveness and co-holding. The
ummary statistics show that both borrowers and co-holders have high levels of debt and are more likely to be impulsive.
To empirically distinguish the behavioral differences which are associated with co-holding distinct from borrowing we
e-estimate a further series of probit models in which we reconﬁgure the control group of observations in the zero category
o be borrowers only. The coefﬁcient estimates in this revised speciﬁcation predict the likelihood of a household co-holding
ompared with borrowing. We  also estimate models for comparison with the controls groups set as the ‘neither/nor’ group
nd the savers group plus an additional comparison group which combines these groups (as the ‘neither/nor’ group are
robably low-level savers).
Table 8 reports estimates from these additional speciﬁcations. In Column 1, where the control is borrowers, the coefﬁcient
n the ﬁnancial literacy score is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. The marginal effect on the literacy score implies a one-
oint increase in literacy raises the likelihood of co-holding by 10%. The coefﬁcient on the ‘expects to be unemployed’ variable
s statistically not signiﬁcant and the coefﬁcient on the ‘likely to borrow more in future’ variable is negative and statistically
igniﬁcant. These imply that co-holding versus borrowing does not arise due to an expectation of unemployment and is
egatively related to the expectation of requiring additional borrowing in future. The result that co-holding is predicted by
etter ﬁnancial literacy lends some support to the notion that co-holding arises as a planned behavior.
Columns 2 and 3 present results where the comparison groups are savers and the ‘neither/nor’ group, respectively. Results
n Column 2 show that impulsiveness strongly predicts co-holding compared with saving alone. Importantly, impulsiveness
redicts co-holding when we include a measure of impatience in the form of the ‘heavy discounter’ variable. The coefﬁcient
n the literacy score in statistically not signiﬁcant implying co-holding compared with saving is not predicted by poor
nancial literacy. In contrast, results in Column 3 show co-holding compared with ‘neither/’nor’ is predicted by both ﬁnancial
iteracy and impulsiveness. In additional estimates not shown, when we combine the ‘neither/nor’ and savers groups we
nd almost identical patterns to the ‘standard’ savers groups: the coefﬁcient on the ﬁnancial literacy variable is positive,
ut not statistically signiﬁcant and the coefﬁcient on the impulsive spender dummy  is positive and statistically signiﬁcant
t the 1% level, the marginal effect indicating impulsiveness is associated with a 86% probability of being a co-holder.
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Table  7
Tobit: amount of co-holding and costly co-holding.
(1) (2)
Tobit Tobit
ˇ/SE ˇ/SE
Age
18–24 −2094.408* −410.025*
(1184.930) (217.459)
25–34 −524.499 −77.198
(714.736) (130.778)
35–44 −527.080 −102.309
(672.894) (123.671)
55+ 149.643 21.904
(713.826) (131.001)
Employment
Employed (=1) 1306.946** 243.322**
(590.621) (108.342)
Unemployed (=1) −173.968 −49.392
(1273.566) (234.672)
Housing
Homeowner without mortgage (=1) −88.624 −33.466
(741.150) (135.647)
Homeowner with mortgage (=1) 1343.101** 211.109*
(594.864) (108.797)
Household ﬁnances
Household income (£10,000s) 2193.200 458.534
(2098.595) (386.943)
Household income2 −721.241 −157.487
(738.084) (136.608)
Income and expenditure risk
Expects to be unemployed (=1) −632.520 −112.658
(793.446) (145.257)
Likely to borrow more in future (=1) −7.057 −11.284
(763.864) (139.996)
Behavioral characteristics
Literacy score (0–3) 264.091 38.502
(238.861) (43.761)
Impulsive spender (=1) 3079.628*** 548.851***
(611.085) (111.971)
Heavy discounter (=1) 628.697 187.208
(719.285) (130.676)
Observations 2584 2584
Pseudo R2/R2 0.019 0.021
LR 2/F 158.948 151.225
Prob > 2/Prob > F 0.000 0.000
Baseline co-holding (£) 462.148 462.148
Dependent variable: (1) Minimum amount of co-holding with lower limit of £0 and (2) amount of high-cost co-holding with lower limit of £0.
Note:  Omitted reference groups are, for Employment: Renter/Student/Housewife/Disabled; for Housing: Private renter/Social renter. Further controls for
spouse employment status, for gender, marital status, dependent children and education leaving age.
Standard errors in parentheses.* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
We  also report estimates from an unordered multinomial probit model shown in Table 8. The multinomial probit model
explicitly models assignment into each of the groups, in contrast to the estimates in Table 8 which only model the bivariate
relationship between co-holding and one of the other group categories. In the multinomial probit model the base is the
co-holder group. Results conﬁrm the pattern in the earlier models for ﬁnancial literacy and impulsiveness. Compared with
being a co-holder, ﬁnancial literacy is positively associated with being a saver and negatively related to being a borrower
or ‘neither/nor’. Being an impulsive spender is negatively related to being a saver or ‘neither/nor’ but positively related to
being a borrower. When we combine the ‘neither/nor’ and savers groups we  again ﬁnd the same pattern in the coefﬁcient
estimates with similar magnitudes.
4. DiscussionHow should we understand these results on the role of behavioral characteristics in co-holding? Our results show that
impulsiveness is positively related to co-holding (as well as borrowing). However, poor ﬁnancial literacy does not predict
co-holding and estimates show ﬁnancial literacy increases the likelihood of co-holding as an alternative to borrowing.
J. Gathergood, J. Weber / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 107 (2014) 455–469 467
Table  8
Probit models of co-holders vs. different comparison groups.
(1) (2) (3)
Control: borrower Control: saver Control: neither–nor
ˇ/SE Margin ˇ/SE Margin ˇ/SE Margin
Age
18–24 −0.452* −0.167* −0.458* −0.133* −0.377 −0.116
(0.266) (0.245) (0.245)
25–34 −0.142 −0.052 −0.042 −0.012 −0.000 −0.000
(0.157) (0.146) (0.147)
35–44 −0.013 −0.005 −0.007 −0.002 −0.025 −0.008
(0.147) (0.137) (0.139)
55+  0.195 0.072 0.015 0.004 0.049 0.015
(0.164) (0.141) (0.141)
Employment
Employed (=1) −0.159 −0.059 0.220* 0.064* 0.185 0.057
(0.139) (0.115) (0.114)
Unemployed (=1) −0.310 −0.115 0.052 0.015 −0.279 −0.086
(0.292) (0.271) (0.245)
Housing
Homeowner without mortgage (=1) 0.713*** 0.263*** −0.228 −0.066 −0.026 −0.008
(0.176) (0.142) (0.140)
Homeowner with mortgage (=1) 0.382*** 0.141*** 0.132 0.038 0.194 0.060
(0.129) (0.118) (0.119)
Household ﬁnances
Household income (£10,000s) 0.444 0.164 0.603 0.175 1.588** 0.487**
(0.624) (0.397) (0.682)
Household income2 −0.119 −0.044 −0.217 −0.063 −0.758** −0.233**
(0.242) (0.140) (0.304)
Income and expenditure risk
Expects to be unemployed (=1) 0.192 0.071 −0.079 −0.023 0.093 0.028
(0.175) (0.154) (0.160)
Likely  to borrow more in future (=1) −0.366** −0.135** 0.303* 0.088* 0.094 0.029
(0.148) (0.174) (0.159)
Behavioral characteristics
Literacy score (0–3) 0.120** 0.044** −0.058 −0.017 0.137*** 0.042***
(0.055) (0.049) (0.046)
Impulsive spender (=1) 0.069 0.026 0.745*** 0.216*** 0.579*** 0.178***
(0.123) (0.131) (0.127)
Heavy discounter (=1) −0.115 −0.043 0.305* 0.088* 0.060 0.018
(0.146) (0.156) (0.153)
Observations 790 1232 1160
Pseudo R2 0.120 0.094 0.105
LR  2 124.315 126.088 136.744
Prob  > 2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Baseline predicted probability 0.427 0.254 0.260
Dependent variable: Binary co-holder variable.
Note:  Omitted reference groups are, for Employment: Renter/Student/Housewife/Disabled; for Housing: Private renter/Social renter. Further controls for
spouse employment status, for gender, marital status, dependent children and education leaving age.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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*** p < 0.01.
This is consistent with the suggestion that co-holding is a planned behavior undertaken by ﬁnancially aware households
nd, as such, lends some support to the accountant-shopper explanation for co-holding suggested by Bertaut et al. (2009).
n their model co-holding is a rational response to the realization of impulsive spending tendencies and dependent on
onsumers being able to correctly predict that their future selves will not conform the preferences of their present selves.
his is consistent with our results that show the strong predictive power of self-assessed impulsiveness on co-holding. At the
ame time, their model does not depend on limited ﬁnancial ability as the co-holding equilibrium is generated even though
oth entities of the dual-self are fully ﬁnancially aware, which again is consistent with our ﬁndings that poor ﬁnancial literacy
oes not predict co-holding.
However, support from our results for the accountant-shopper explanation for co-holding should be offered with caveats.
irstly, in our sample only one quarter of co-holding households report impulsive spending, so an explanation for co-
olding based on impulsiveness can only explain some of the observed co-holding in our data. Secondly, although our
stimates include measures of perceived predictable unemployment- and income risk and we account for liquidity plus and
recautionary needs by allowing for a buffer of one-month’s income, we  cannot rule out the possibility that unpredictable
diosyncratic risk contributes to co-holding.
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Table  9
Multinomial probit model (marginal effects).
(1) (2) (3)
Outcome: borrower Outcome: saver Outcome: neither–nor
Margin/SE Margin/SE Margin/SE
Age
18–24 −0.011 0.065 0.008
(0.035) (0.050) (0.048)
25–34 0.000 0.047 −0.040
(0.024) (0.036) (0.034)
35–44 −0.009 0.018 0.007
(0.023) (0.035) (0.033)
55+ −0.038 0.040 0.002
(0.025) (0.034) (0.032)
Employment
Employed (=1) 0.075*** −0.072*** −0.047*
(0.020) (0.027) (0.025)
Unemployed (=1) 0.047 −0.133** 0.097*
(0.039) (0.057) (0.051)
Housing
Homeowner without mortgage (=1) −0.167*** 0.154*** 0.018
(0.025) (0.033) (0.031)
Homeowner with mortgage (=1) −0.071*** 0.042 −0.018
(0.019) (0.029) (0.027)
Household ﬁnances
Household income (£10,000s) 0.037 −0.043 −0.159
(0.074) (0.108) (0.147)
Household income2 −0.031 −0.008 0.108
(0.030) (0.046) (0.070)
Income and expenditure risk
Expects to be unemployed (=1) −0.045 0.069* −0.008
(0.028) (0.040) (0.038)
Likely to borrow more in future (=1) 0.134*** −0.154*** −0.004
(0.024) (0.042) (0.037)
Behavioral characteristics
Literacy score (0–3) −0.016** 0.068*** −0.061***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
Impulsive spender (=1) 0.093*** −0.153*** −0.055*
(0.021) (0.035) (0.032)
Heavy discounter (=1) 0.073*** −0.092** −0.007
(0.024) (0.039) (0.036)
Observations 2584 2584 2584
Baseline predicted probability 0.170 0.362 0.333
Base group: Outcome ‘Coholder’.
Note:  Omitted reference groups are, for Employment: Renter/Student/Housewife/Disabled; for Housing: Private renter/Social renter. Further controls for
spouse employment status, for gender, marital status, dependent children and education leaving age.
Standard errors in parentheses.* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
Also, our cross-sectional data does not allow us to observe whether co-holding among sample households is a temporary
or persistent phenomenon. This distinction is important for understanding whether impulsiveness is a short-term or long-
term driver of co-holding and whether it occurs as a planned behavior or short-term ﬁnancial mistake. Panel data would
allow for additional insight into the dynamics of co-holding. Finally, we  cannot rule out the possibility that other explanations
for co-holding (such as precautionary liquidity management) might interact with ﬁnancial literacy and/or impulsiveness.
Our results on the relationship between ﬁnancial literacy and co-holding do provide an example, however, of how the
observed relationship between ﬁnancial literacy and ﬁnancial behavior might create surprising counter-intuitive results.
The ﬁnancial literacy literature typically ﬁnds that better ﬁnancial literacy is associated with better ﬁnancial outcomes such
as more adequate preparation for retirement, portfolio diversiﬁcation and use of lower-cost credit. In our analysis, among
borrowers better ﬁnancial literacy is associated with co-holding behavior which appears sub-optimal but which may  actually
be welfare improving for consumers.
5. ConclusionThe ‘co-holding puzzle’ is a violation of a simple arbitrage opportunity between liquid assets and debt on the part of
households in their consumer ﬁnances. It has given rise to a puzzle in the household ﬁnance literature: why does a subset
of households hold high cost consumer credit and low yield liquid savings simultaneously? Various explanations have been
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uggested as to why consumers engage in this behavior. In this paper we  have provided new empirical evidence on the role
f ﬁnancial literacy and lack of self-control (or impulsiveness) in co-holding.
We have presented empirical evidence from a UK household survey which incorporated measures of ﬁnancial literacy
nd impulsiveness. Our results show co-holding is positively associated with self-reported impulsive spending on the part
f respondents, which increases the probability of co-holding by between two thirds and more than three quarters. There
s no evidence that respondents who report co-holding misunderstand central tenets of consumer ﬁnance such as interest
ate calculation and interest compounding.
A challenge in analyzing apparent ‘puzzles’ in household ﬁnancial management involves not only observing apparent
iolations of rational behavior on the part of households, but also understanding the types of mechanisms and facilities
ouseholds might utilize to accommodate tenets of their behavior which prevent them from behaving in a purely rational
anner. Our results suggest a behavioral explanation might go some way  to explaining observed co-holding behavior.
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